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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of LLOYD N. X. JONES, 88-A-7262, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
GEORGE B. ALEXANDER, CHAIRMAN, 
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Respondent, 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI ## 01-08-ST9190 Index No. 4719-tizBI a 
Appearances : Lloyd N. X. Jones, 
Inmate No.88-A-7262 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Elmira Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 500 
1879 Davis Street 
Elmira New York, 14902-0500 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Rcspondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(C. Harris Dague, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
Georgc U. Cmsia,  Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Elmira Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent made on October 23, 
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2007 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving concurrent 
terms of fifteen years to life for attempted murder in the first degree (two counts), fifteen 
years to life for kidnaping in the first degree (two counts), and a term of eight years to life 
for burglary in the second degree. The petitioner has been denied parole three times 
previously. Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the 
respondent failed to follow the statutory guidelines for parole determination set out in 
Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A). He mentions that two of his disciplinary determinations 
were reversed and expunged. He indicates that he has made plans to be reunited with his 
children and grandchildren upon being released. In the petitioner’s view, the Parole Board 
ignored his accomplishments while incarcerated. The petitioner asserts that the Parole 
Board’s determination, in not releasing him, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
United States Constitution He also maintains that the twenty-four month hold was excessive 
and unnecessary. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“P;irole de n i d  Your instant offense, Attempt& Murder 1 St, 
Kidnaping lst , Burglary 2”d was committed while you were on 
Federal Supervision for Bank Robbery,. You also incurred a 
prior out of state conviction for attempted armed robbery. 
“You have maintained a clean disciplinary record since your last 
parole board appearance. 
“This panel notes your positive programmatic participation 
including completion of ART and RSAT as well as your 
continued productive work as a group leader. Following 
deliberation, this decision is based on review of the case record 
as well 2s the interview with parole board members.’’ 
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As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]). 
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinor>oli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (see Ristau v. 
Hamma&. 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermoret only a “showing of irrationality 
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate 
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting 
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence 
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of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made 
by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294 
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
While the Court is mindful of the recent decision in Matter of Vaello v Parole Board 
(48 AD3d 10 18 [3d Dept., 2008]), the Court is also aware ofthe decision in Matter of Silvero 
v Dennison (28 AD3d 859 [3d Dept., 2006). In Vaello, the inmate’s petition was granted, 
and the parole determination reversed, by reason that it was not apparent that the Parole 
Board considered any of the statutory factors set forth in Executive Law 0 2594. In Silvero, 
the Court held that the failure of the Parole Board to recite the precise statutory language of 
the first sentence of Executive Law 0 2594 (2) (c) (A) to support its conclusion does not 
undermine its determination, so long as the underlying statutory criteria were considered 
(Silvero, supra, at 859-860). In this instance, in addition to mentioning the crimes for which 
the petitioner was convicted, the Parole Board also noted his clean disciplinary record, his 
positive programing, and his relationship with staff and other inmates (specifically with 
respect to being a group leader). A review of the transcript of the parole interview reveals 
i h i  aite~iiiori was paid to such factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his clean 
disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. 
The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the 
denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law g259-i (see Matter of 
Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 
19941; Matter of Green v. hew k ork btate Uivision of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 
1993j). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of 
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the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division 
of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State 
Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, Puma; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd 
Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 
629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The 
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it 
considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see 
Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 20081). Nor 
must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of 
Executive Law tj 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable 
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a 
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other 
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law 8259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
Pctitioner’s claims that the determination to dwy parole is tantaiiiount to a re- 
sentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple 
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter o t  Bockeno v hew York State 
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Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive 
DePartment Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v 
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has 
served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty 
interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 11 14, 11 15 [3rd Dept., 
20081). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was 
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of 
petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of 
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; 
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 20071). 
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the 
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates 
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [ 19791; Matter of Russo v 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that 
Executive Law 9 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlemerrt to, or a legitimate 
expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated 
by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 
169, 171 [2d Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; m h e j  
Hammock, 605 F2d 66 1,664 [2d Cir., 19791; Paunetto v Hammock, 5 16 F Supp 1367,1367- 
1368 [SD NY, 19811; Matter of Russo v hew k'ork State Bd. ofYarole, 50 NY2d 69,75-76, 
SUUILL, Matter 01 bamez v Dennison, 18 AU3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v 
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New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court, 
accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
In addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta 
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 
NY2d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without 
merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are 
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this 
DecisiodurdedJudgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this 
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: December /7 ,2008 
Troy, New York 







Order To Show Cause dated July 8,2008, Petition, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
Respondent’s Answer dated August 28,2008 , Supporting Papers and 
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